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FISCAL AND TAX COMPETITIVENESSThe Alberta government is heavily exposed to energy price volatility, as the province relies to
a great extent on revenues derived from the production of oil and natural gas. Energy prices
change substantially and unpredictably, causing large and uncertain movements in revenues.
Adjusting to these movements typically involves economic, social, and political costs. 
Alberta’s revenues are considerably more volatile than the revenues of other provinces because
of Alberta’s greater dependence on energy-related revenues and the high volatility of these
revenues. One way to reduce the volatility of revenues is to diversify the tax base – through,
for example, the use of a sales tax. But that method would have a small effect on overall
revenue volatility since Alberta’s resource revenues are such a large share of total own-source
revenues. Another method would be to smooth revenue, using futures and options markets,
but that approach could be expensive and politically risky, and would not eliminate all
revenue volatility. 
The best option is a resource revenue stabilization fund. Such a fund would reduce revenue
volatility in Alberta significantly. It would lead to greater revenue stability because the money
it would contribute to the budget in any particular year would be based on revenues averaged
over prior years. A stabilization fund also would reduce uncertainty, since current revenue
would depend on known past contributions to the fund. Key characteristics that would
increase the probability of a stabilization fund’s success are its simplicity, transparency, and a
gradual transition to full implementation.
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O
il and natural gas prices often
change rapidly, substantially,
and unpredictably.
The Alberta government is heavily exposed to
energy price volatility because it relies to a large
extent on revenue derived from the production 
of oil and natural gas. For Alberta, as for the
governments of other energy-producing
jurisdictions, adjusting to large revenue
movements typically involves economic, social,
and political costs. Rapid declines in energy
revenues can lead to pressure for cuts in
expenditures that are difficult to accomplish
quickly and efficiently. Revenue volatility that
drives government expenditures 
can also cause fiscal policy to be procyclical, 
thus magnifying movements in economic activity.
This paper provides an analysis of the volatility
of Alberta government revenues and possible
methods of dealing with this volatility. Alberta’s
revenues are considerably more variable than 
those of other provinces; importantly, however,
the volatility of Alberta’s own-source revenues 
less resource revenues is similar to that of 
other provinces. 
One commonly proposed method to reduce the
volatility of revenues is tax base diversification,
through the use of, say, a sales tax. We show,
however, that this approach would have a
relatively small effect on overall revenue volatility
since Alberta’s resource revenues are such a large
share of own-source revenues. Other alternatives,
such as revenue smoothing using futures and
options markets, can be expensive, are associated
with significant political risks, and cannot
eliminate all revenue volatility. Movements of the
exchange rate are another source of revenue
stabilization, since the Canadian dollar tends 
to appreciate when energy prices rise and to
depreciate when they fall, but this effect is
relatively small. 
An effective approach to address revenue
volatility is to establish a resource revenue
stabilization fund with fixed contribution and
withdrawal rates. A simulation using Alberta 
data for the past 30 years shows that this form of
stabilization fund would lead to greater revenue
stability, both because a large fixed fraction of
volatile resource revenues would be deposited in
the fund and because the revenue contributed to
the budget from the fund in any particular year
would depend on contributions to the fund in all
previous years. Revenue uncertainty also would be
reduced with a stabilization fund since future
revenue would depend on known past
contributions. In comparison, the Alberta
Heritage Savings Trust Fund’s ability to stabilize
revenues is quite limited: when the fund was
established, it received a fixed percentage of
resource revenues each year, but this practice was
ended in 1987, although the fund has received ad
hoc contributions from general revenues in several
recent years (Alberta 2010b).
Problems with Revenue Volatility
Government revenue volatility can have important
negative consequences. A government that wishes
to provide infrastructure and social services at a
level that is sustainable in the longer term will
have difficulty setting the appropriate level of
spending when it is not clear what part of volatile
revenue changes is permanent and what part is
temporary. Revenue volatility can also make it
more difficult for a government to put in place
long-term plans if volatility undermines the
government’s credibility in terms of its ability
accurately to forecast and manage revenues 
(Tuer 2002, 25). The two provinces most heavily
reliant on volatile energy revenues, Alberta and
Saskatchewan, have the worst records at 
hitting budget targets (Busby and Robson 2010).
Revenue volatility also makes it more difficult
for the private sector to predict future government
tax and spending policies, which could have
important consequences for private-sector
investment decisions, leading to slower economic
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The authors received helpful comments on an earlier draft from Ken Boessenkool, Colin Busby, Ben Dachis, Bev Dahlby, Herb Emery, 
Mel McMillan, Barry Scholnick.  However, the authors retain sole responsibility for any errors. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at a C.D. Howe Institute and University of Alberta Institute for Public Economics Conference on May 6th and 7th, 2010.growth (Barnett and Ossowski 2002; Afonso and
Furceri 2008; Sturm, Gurtner, and Alegre 2009).   
Another major consequence of revenue
volatility is that, in many jurisdictions, it induces
volatile movements in government spending.
When revenues expand during a boom,
expenditures tend to grow, but when revenues fall,
expenditures are cut, although often more slowly
than expenditures initially rose.
1 That is, revenue
volatility can cause governments to pursue stop-go
procyclical fiscal policies (Sturm, Gurtner, and
Alegre 2009). These procyclical policies accentuate
the effects of economic cycles so that, rather than
acting to reduce volatility, the government
becomes a driving force magnifying output
fluctuations. The volatility of economic activity
and the volatile provision of government services
then reduce individual welfare if consumers prefer
less variable income and consumption. Further,
given the real costs of moving resources between
expanding and contracting sectors, it is especially
important for government policy to help stabilize
the economy, rather than to aggravate economic
volatility. 
Government spending increases during revenue
booms compete with private-sector spending,
which can raise wages and other input costs,
thereby increasing both public and private-sector
costs. There is some indication that increases in
government revenues are correlated with upward
pressure on prices. In Alberta, for example, the
prices of current goods and services purchased by
government rose at an average annual rate of 4.1
percent between 2002 and 2008, while they rose
by only 2.6 percent in British Columbia and 3.3
percent in Ontario. During this same period, real
per capita government revenues rose more than
twice as fast in Alberta as in either Ontario or
British Columbia. 
Large increases in government revenues during
booms also can lead governments to spend on
services and investment projects that have
relatively low returns. In turn, the rapid expansion
of programs and capital spending during revenue
booms can stretch the capacity of governments to
provide services and monitor spending, leading to
waste, inefficiency, and the unproductive use of
government funds (Barnett and Ossowski 2002).
Further, during a revenue collapse, it is difficult to
cut spending efficiently – that is, to cut first those
projects and services with the lowest taxpayer
benefit. Large spending cuts precipitated by a 
fall in revenues also can damage the morale and
capacity of the public sector, leading to the more
inefficient provision of public services. 
To the extent that it is easier politically to raise
government spending than to reduce it, there
might be a greater tendency to expand spending
in revenue booms than to contract spending in
busts. Thus, revenue volatility can result in an
expansion of the size of government and,
potentially, the implementation of an
unsustainable fiscal plan that necessitates 
even greater expenditure cuts in the future.
2
The Volatility of Alberta 
Government Revenues
3
The Alberta government’s own-source revenues –
total revenues less transfers from other levels of
government – are quite volatile relative to those 
of the other provinces (see Figure 1).
4 Over the
period from 1982 to 2007, the year-to-year
change in Alberta’s real per capita own-source
revenues exceeded 10 percent nine times. In
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1 For example, Busby and Robson (2010) find a significant and large positive correlation between within-year Alberta government spending
adjustments and deviations of revenues from budget projections.
2 Kneebone and McKenzie (2000) report that, over the 1962-93 period, unexpected increases in revenues tended to be treated as permanent
by Alberta budgetmakers and to lead to expenditure increases, while unexpected decreases tended to be treated as temporary, causing no
corresponding spending reduction. Interviews reported by Boothe (1995) support these results. 
3 Sources and definitions for the data used in the text, figures and tables are given in the Data Appendix.
4 Revenue volatility depends on both movements in tax bases and changes in tax rates. Due to difficulties with obtaining data on different tax
rates through time, for the most part the analysis focuses on revenue volatility and does not distinguish whether this volatility is due to tax
base or tax rate volatility. comparison, this magnitude of revenue change
occurred on only six occasions in Saskatchewan,
only once in British Columbia, and not at all in
Ontario.
A useful way to compare revenue volatility 
is to examine the coefficient of variation. This
commonly used measure of volatility is the
standard deviation (the square root of the
variance) divided by the mean.
5 The advantage 
of this measure over others, such as the standard
deviation, is that its value does not depend on the
units by which a variable is measured. This is
desirable since government per capita revenues
often differ greatly across provinces and revenue
types. For the period 1981-2007, the coefficient
of variation for Alberta government real per capita
own-source revenues is 15.4, while for British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario the
coefficients of variation are 7.8, 6.5, and 6.2,
respectively (Table 1).
6 Thus, Alberta’s own-source
revenues were more than twice as variable as those
of the other three provinces over that period. In
dollar terms, these volatility values imply that a
one standard deviation band around average real
per capita own-source revenues for Alberta is
$2,188, but only $906 for British Columbia. 
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5 Since government revenues grow through time, the standard deviation is calculated after de-trending. The ratio is also multiplied by 
100 to put it in percentage terms.
6 Since the coefficients of variation are smaller for total revenues relative to those for own-source revenues, federal transfers have, on 
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Note: Values are in constant 2002 dollars.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information.
Figure 1:  Real Per Capita Own-Source Revenue – Difference from Trend, Selected Provinces, 1981-2007The Causes of Alberta’s 
Revenue Volatility
The greater variability of Alberta government
revenues is driven principally by the highly volatile
energy sector resource component of revenues
and, to a much smaller extent, by the volatility of
corporate profits (see Figure 2 and Table 2).
Volatility in these revenue sources, in turn, is
driven mainly by movements in energy prices. 
The Magnitude and Volatility of Alberta’s
Resource Revenues
For Alberta, the simple correlation between the
growth rate (the year-to-year percentage change) of
real per capita total own-source revenues and the
growth rate of resource revenues was 0.90 over the
period from 1982 to 2007 (Table 3).
7 The growth
rate of corporate tax revenues had the next highest
correlation with own-source revenues, at 0.71. In
contrast, for personal income taxes, the second-
largest tax source in Alberta, the correlation with
own-source revenues was only 0.42 over the
period. In the other provinces, own-source
revenues were less correlated with resource
revenues and, in general, more highly correlated
with personal income tax revenues.
One reason for the large impact of resource
revenue volatility on Alberta’s own-source revenue
volatility is that resource revenues are the largest
single component of the province’s own-source
revenues, accounting, on average, for 31 percent
of real per capita own-source revenues from 1981
to 2007; the next-largest revenue type, personal
income taxes, accounted for only 20.5 percent. As
Table 4 shows, the share of resource revenues in
Alberta’s own-source revenues is large relative to
other provinces. Resource revenues made up only
14.6 percent of Saskatchewan’s own-source
revenues over the 1981 to 2007 period and were
the province’s third-largest revenue source, after
personal income taxes and the retail sales tax. In
British Columbia, resource revenues were only
10.3 percent of revenues and the fourth-largest
revenue type, while in Ontario resource revenues
were an insignificant component of own-source
revenues.
Not only are resource revenues by far the largest
component of government revenues in Alberta,
| 4 Commentary 313
C.D. Howe Institute
7 To represent resource revenues here, we used "royalties" as designated by Statistics Canada; these revenues include Crown lease payments,
but not "miscellaneous taxes on natural resources."
Real per capita revenue ($ 2002)
Total revenue 8,063 7,327 6,772 5,508
Own-source revenue 7,105 5,639 5,810 4,707
Percentage share of total revenue 88.1 77.0 85.8 85.5
Own-source revenue minus resource revenue 4,899 4,817 5,211 4,684
Percentage share of total revenue 60.8 65.7 76.9 85.0
Coefficients of variation
Total revenue 13.4 6.5 6.3 5.0
Own-source revenue 15.4 6.5 7.8 6.2
Own-source revenue minus resource revenue 6.7 9.2 8.1 6.2
Table 1: Average Real Per Capita Revenue and Volatility, Selected Provinces, 1981-2007
Note: The coefficient of variation, a measure of volatility, is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the standard deviation of the 
differences from an exponential trend to the average value of the series. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information.
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they are also the most variable. The coefficient 
of variation associated with resource revenues in
Alberta over the period from 1981 to 2007 is 43.6
(Table 2).
8 A one standard deviation band around
$2,208 – the average value of real per capita
resource revenues – ranges from $1,245 to
$3,169. The magnitude of this band, $1,924, is
equivalent to 27 percent of average own-source
revenues. In comparison, corporate income taxes,
the second-most-variable component of revenues,
with a coefficient of variation of 24.2, have a one
standard deviation band of only $284.  
The volatility of resource revenues is due
primarily to variation in energy prices, particularly
the price of natural gas, which accounted for 45
percent of total resource receipts from 1981 to
2009 and 54 percent over the past five years
(Table 5). Over the period from 1982 to 2007,
the correlation between the growth rate of real 
per capita resource revenues and the growth rate
of the real Canadian dollar price of natural gas is
0.87. Changes in this price also drove changes in
total real per capita own-source revenues: the
correlation between the growth rate of real per
capita own-source revenues and the real Canadian
dollar natural gas price is 0.68. In comparison, the
correlation between changes in real per capita
own-source revenues less resource revenues and
changes in the real natural gas price is only 0.13.
The correlations for West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) petroleum are similar to those for natural
gas (Table 6). Given the volatility of energy prices
8 This level of variability is not unique to Alberta but is similar in magnitude to the export revenue volatility of 21 major petroleum exporters
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Note: Values are in constant 2002 dollars.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information.
Figure 2: Average Real Per Capita Revenue and One Standard Deviation Band, Selected Provinces, 
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and the close relationship between resource
revenues and energy prices, it is not surprising
that resource revenues are quite volatile. The
coefficients of variation over the period from 1981
to 2007 of the real Canadian dollar prices of
natural gas and WTI petroleum are 42.0 and
39.4, respectively. This level of volatility is similar
to that of resource revenues, while the volatility of
other tax bases tends to be much smaller – for
example, the volatility measure for personal
income, the tax base for the personal income tax,
is just 4.8 (Table 2).
Much of the volatility of Alberta government
revenues has been driven by persistent movements
away from trend. As Figure 1 above shows, real
per capita own-source revenues were above trend
from 1981 to 1985, below trend from 1986
through 1999, above trend in 2000 and 2001,
below in 2002, and above trend from 2003
through 2007. The longer-term movements in
revenues away from trend are driven by
movements in resource revenues, as own-source
revenues minus resource revenues move above 
and below trend twice as often as total own-source
revenues (Figure 3). The persistence of revenue
movements above and below trend are important
because they imply that downturns in revenues
might not be short lived, while upturns might
Table 2: Volatility of Government Revenue and Selected Tax Bases, Alberta, 1981-2007
Real Per Capita Government Revenue
Total revenue 13.4
Own-source revenue 15.4
Own-source revenue minus resource revenue 6.7
Resource revenue 43.6
Corporate income tax 24.2
Interest and other investment income 14.9
Personal income tax 10.2
Retail sales tax 12.0
Gaming profits 6.3
Gasoline tax 3.2
Real Per Capita Tax Base Variables
Corporation profits before taxes 36.0
Interest and miscellaneous investment income 21.4
Final demand 8.3
Wages, salaries, and supplementary labour income 8.2
Personal income 4.8
Expenditure on consumer goods 2.7
Real Energy Prices
West Texas Intermediate petroleum price (US dollars) 46.9
West Texas Intermediate petroleum price (Canadian dollars)   39.4
Natural gas price (US dollars) 46.3
Natural gas price (Canadian dollars)  42.0
Note: The coefficient of variation, a measure of volatility, is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the standard deviation of the differences from 
an exponential trend to the average value of the series. The sample period for Alberta’s retail sales tax, gaming profits, and gasoline 
tax is 1994–2007, because the use of these taxes changed considerably in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The retail sales tax includes
taxes on alcohol and tobacco only.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information.
Coefficient of Variationseem permanent and, thereby, induce too great 
an increase in spending.
Considerable evidence suggests that movements
in oil prices are persistent (Hamilton 2008).
Given the dependence of resource revenues on
energy prices, the long movements in own-source
revenues away from trend can be attributed to this
persistence. As a consequence, resource revenues
have no tendency to converge quickly to some
stable average value.
The Volatility of Non-Resource Revenues 
After resource revenues, corporate tax revenues 
are the most volatile revenue type in Alberta
(Table 2). The coefficient of variation of Alberta’s
real per capita corporate tax revenues for the
period from 1981 to 2007 is 24.2, which is similar
to the volatility of corporate tax revenues in both
Saskatchewan and Ontario. Although volatile,
corporate tax revenues have not been a large driver
of overall revenue volatility, since they accounted
for only 8.3 percent of own-source revenues over
the 1981-2007 period, or just one-quarter of the
share of the more volatile resource component of
revenues. In fact, the real per capita dollar value 
of the one standard deviation band around average
corporate tax revenues is almost identical to that
for the much less volatile revenues from personal
income taxes because personal income taxes
contributed a much larger share of total own-
source revenues – 20.5 percent on average.
Nevertheless, both resource revenues and
corporate tax revenues are more highly correlated
with energy prices than are personal income tax
revenues. 
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Table 3: Correlation Coefficient between the Percentage Change in  Total Own-Source Revenue 
and the Percentage Change in the  Variable Indicated, Selected Provinces, 1982-2007
Note: Values for Alberta's retail sales tax and Ontario's resource revenue are not included because Alberta does not have a general retail 
sales tax that is comparable to the retail sales taxes in the other provinces, and Ontario's resource tax royalties are extremely small.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information. 
Own-source revenue minus resource revenue .75 .86 .92 1.00
Resource revenue .90 .67 .59 –
Corporate income tax .71 .33 .46 .83
Personal income tax .42 .20 .66 .74 
Retail sales taxes – .53 .49 .75
Table 4: Selected Revenue Types: Average Share of Real Per Capita Own-Source Revenue, 
Selected Provinces, 1981–2007
Note: Sales tax includes alcohol and tobacco taxes; Alberta has no general retail sales tax.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information.
(percent)
Resource revenue 31.1 14.6 10.3 0.5
Personal income tax 20.5 22.6 24.7 33.2
Sales tax 2.0 16.0 18.0 22.6
Corporate income tax 8.3 4.4 4.9 8.8
Interest and other investment income 15.7 12.4 9.1 4.8
Contributions to social insurance and other 7.5 4.9 11.3 10.2
transfers from persons
British
Alberta             Saskatchewan          Columbia             Ontario
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Thus, movements in energy prices might cause
synchronized movements in both types of tax
revenues, accentuating the volatility 
of total revenues (Table 6).
A comparison of the volatility of non-resource
own-source revenues in Alberta and other
provinces illustrates the importance of the role
played by the volatility of resource payments in
generating Alberta government revenue volatility.
While the coefficient of variation of Alberta’s real
per capita own-source revenues for the period
from 1981 to 2007 is 15.4, the coefficient of
variation of own-source revenues less resource
revenues is 6.7 (Table 1), only slightly higher than
the corresponding measure for Ontario (6.2) and
lower than those for British Columbia (8.1) and
Saskatchewan (9.2). Hence, Alberta’s non-resource
own-source revenues are, on average, similar in
terms of volatility as those of the other provinces. 
How to Reduce Revnue Volatility
Alberta government revenue volatility is driven
primarily by resource revenue volatility, which, in
turn, is driven by energy price volatility. Yet
energy prices are determined in world or North
Table 5: Real Per Capita Natural Resource Revenue by Type,  Alberta, Fiscal Years 1981/82-2008/09
*Crude oil royalties for 1984/85-1988/89 include synthetic crude products.
Sources: Revenues are from Alberta, Department of Energy, Annual Report, various issues. Data for population and the price index are from 
Statistics Canada as described in the Data Appendix. These population and price data are annual, so data are for the calendar year in which the
fiscal year begins.
(constant 2002 dollars)
1981/82 1,768 1,970 503 208 4,669
1982/83 1,453 1,815 261 281 4,005
1983/84 1,210 2,059 348 217 4,029
1984/85 1,359 2,137 463 na* 4,203
1985/86 1,235 1,888 495 na* 3,841
1986/87 718 665 191 na* 1,585
1987/88 638 858 480 na* 1,970
1988/89 600 581 273 na* 1,554
1989/90 548 642 222 16 1,522
1990/91 576 707 222 21 1,630
1991/92 420 520 131 16 1,192
1992/93 513 485 80 31 1,204
1993/94 651 354 331 30 1,463
1994/95 562 491 437 93 1,688
1995/96 444 466 255 138 1,410
1996/97 559 596 399 220 1,890
1997/98 680 368 439 79 1,559
1998/99 581 178 184 23 931
1999/00 927 419 282 162 1,777
2000/01 2,583 538 416 255 3,797
2001/02 1,376 337 331 63 2,126
2002/03 1,638 376 181 58 2,279
2003/04 1,665 300 295 60 2,346
2004/05 1,875 371 365 209 2,838
2005/06 2,289 399 952 259 3,915
2006/07 1,525 356 627 614 3,122
2007/08 1,247 397 270 699 2,644
2008/09 1,303 402 248 664 2,661
Fiscal
Year










ResourceAmerican markets and effectively are out of the
control of the Alberta government. How, then,
could revenue volatility be reduced? Methods
include limiting the influence of resource revenues
on movements in overall revenues – say, by tax
base “diversification” – hedging in futures or
options markets, and using a stabilization fund. 
Tax Base Diversification
One method to reduce revenue volatility is to
decrease the dependence of revenues on the more
volatile energy-related tax bases through tax base
diversification, which motivates suggestions that
Alberta implement policies to diversify its
economy away from energy-related activities.
Policies of this type, however, have three
shortcomings. First, such an approach could take
a long time to yield results; second, it would run
counter to Alberta’s comparative advantage –
namely, the extraction of energy resources; and
third, government-encouraged economic
diversification relies on governments’ ability to
pick successful non-energy-related industries, 
but there is little evidence that they can do 
this effectively.
Another way to reduce the dependence of total
revenues on the energy sector is to collect less
revenue from the more volatile energy-related tax
bases: energy sector production (resource-based
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Table 6: Correlation Coefficients between Annual Percentage Changes, Alberta, 1982-2007
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information.
Real per capita government revenue
Total revenue .90 .71 .73
Own-source revenue .90 .68 .72
Own-source revenue minus resource revenue .42 .13 .53
Personal income tax .13 - .08 .28
Interest and other investment income .26 .28 .19
Corporate income tax .57 .28 .68
Resource revenue – .87 .70
Real per capita tax base variables
Wages, salaries, and supplementary labour income .23 .24 .22
Personal income .20 .14 .20
Expenditure on consumer goods .16 .07 .25
Final demand .31 .27 .30
Interest and miscellaneous investment income .95 .81 .73
Corporation profits before taxes .83 .70 .71
Prices
Exchange rate (Canadian dollars per US dollar) -.13 -.06 -.31
Natural gas price (US dollars) .86 .98 .52
Natural gas price (Canadian dollars) .87 – .49
West Texas Intermediate petroleum price (US dollars) .66 .46 .98
West Texas Intermediate petroleum price (Canadian dollars) .70 .49 –
WTI
Resource               Natural                 Petroleum                 
Revenue             Gas Price ($C)         Price ($C) revenues) and corporate profits. For example,
suppose the Alberta government had set royalty
rates and corporate tax rates at levels that would
have collected 25 percent less revenue than was
actually collected from these sources over the
1981 to 2007 period. Assuming no change in
other tax revenues, the lower tax rates would have
reduced own-source revenue volatility by just 14
percent – that is, the coefficient of variation of
Alberta’s real per capita own-source revenues
would have declined from 15.4 to 13.2, while
average own-source revenues would have fallen by
just under 10 percent. Thus, even with a
significant revenue sacrifice, revenue volatility
would have remained high because resource
revenues would have continued to constitute a
large proportion of total own-source revenues.
More important, it might be undesirable to
reduce resource revenues on the grounds of
economic efficiency since, to the extent that
royalties are taxes on rents, they are likely to be
less distortionary than other forms of taxation.  
A Sales Tax
Another often-mentioned way to reduce revenue
volatility through tax base diversification is to
place greater emphasis on a sales tax, a revenue
source that has been relatively underexploited in
Alberta (see Table 4).
9 Including taxes on alcohol
and tobacco, Saskatchewan collected $900 per
capita in sales taxes on average from 1981 to 2007
(in constant 2002 dollars), Ontario collected
$1,063, and British Columbia collected $1,043;
in contrast, Alberta collected only $141. Thus,
there seems ample opportunity for Alberta to raise
revenues significantly through the imposition of a
sales tax.
10 Further, Alberta’s potential sales tax
base tends to be relatively stable: for the period
from 1981 to 2007, the volatility measures of two
possible definitions of the sales tax base – real per
capita expenditure on consumer goods and real
per capita final demand – were just 2.7 and 8.3,
respectively. Thus, these tax bases are much less
volatile than energy prices (Table 2) and have a
low correlation with energy prices (Table 6). Sales
tax revenues also have proved to be quite stable in
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9 Among those who have suggested the introduction of a sales tax is Alberta MLA Doug Griffiths, the parliamentary secretary to the province's
finance minister; see Archie McLean, "Boom-bust revenues prompt sales tax talk," Edmonton Journal, May 22, 2010. McKenzie (2000) also
advocates a sales tax for Alberta, but for reasons other than the reduction of revenue volatility. 
10 In the United States, median state sales tax revenue accounts for about 30 percent of total state revenues (Felix 2008).
Table 7: Coefficients of Variation for Various Revenue Types, Selected Provinces, 1981-2007
Note:  The coefficient of variation, a measure of volatility, is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the standard deviation of the differences 
from an exponential trend to the average value of the series. Values for Alberta's retail sales tax and Ontario's resource revenue are not
included because Alberta does not have a general retail sales tax that is comparable to the retail sales taxes in the other provinces, and
Ontario's resource tax royalties are extremely small.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information.
British
Alberta Saskatchewan Columbia Ontario
(percent)
Total own-source revenue 15.4 6.5 7.8 6.2
Resource revenue 43.6 41.4 16.0 –
Personal income tax 10.2 11.4 13.8 8.1
Corporate income tax 24.2 23.6 18.6 23.1
Interest and other investment income 14.8 18.3 29.9 8.9
Retail sales tax  – 9.5 5.4 8.8Commentary 313 | 11
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other provinces: the coefficient of variation for
real per capita sales tax revenue is only 5.4 for
British Columbia and approximately 9 for both
Saskatchewan and Ontario (Table 7).
A simple example illustrates the potential
impact on Alberta’s revenue volatility of greater
reliance on a sales tax.
11 This example is intended
to give a general indication of the effect of the
adoption of a sales tax on overall revenue
volatility, not to act as a policy prescription. While
it is possible to estimate the tax revenues Alberta
could have raised from a sales tax, we use the 
more straightforward procedure of assuming that
Alberta could have collected real per capita sales
tax revenues equal to those levied by British
Columbia during the 1981-2007 period.
12 Rather
than add a sales tax to the existing revenue base
and, therefore, increase the total tax burden, we
assess the impact on volatility of substituting the
sales tax revenues raised by British Columbia for
the revenues raised by the Alberta corporate tax.
We chose the corporate tax because it yields
volatile revenues that, on average, are similar in
magnitude to the revenues raised from the British
11  This example differs from the proposal in McKenzie (2000) to replace Alberta's personal income tax with a sales tax, which is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on revenue variation since both personal income tax revenues and sales tax revenues are quite stable (see Table 7).
12  To make the level of revenues similar in the two cases, we use British Columbia's actual real per capita retail sales tax revenues to replace Alberta's
alcohol and tobacco tax revenues as well as its corporate tax revenues. With these changes, Alberta's real per capita own-source revenues would
have averaged $7,419 over the period, as opposed to the actual value of $7,105. If Alberta were to introduce a sales tax, it would probably be in
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Figure 3: Real Per Capita Own-Source Revenue minus Royalties, Difference from Trend, Selected 
Provinces, 1981-2007Columbia sales tax. Holding everything else
constant, the adoption of a sales tax yielding per
capita revenues identical to those collected by
British Columbia, along with the elimination of
the volatile corporate profits tax, would cause the
volatility of Alberta’s own-source revenues to fall
by only 11.5 percent (from 15.4 to 13.6). Thus,
even the complete replacement of volatile
corporate tax revenues with much more stable
sales tax revenues would yield only a relatively
small drop in the volatility of own-source
revenues. The reason for this small change in
volatility is that sales tax revenues are fairly small
compared with resource revenues and, thus, the
volatility of revenues would continue to be driven
by resource revenue volatility.
13 
Other Sources of Revenue
The opportunity to reduce revenue volatility by
exploiting revenue sources other than the sales tax
also appears limited. Personal income tax revenues
tend to be relatively stable and are only weakly
correlated with resource revenues and energy
prices (Tables 2 and 6). On the other hand, in
2007, real per capita personal income tax revenues
were already higher in Alberta than in British
Columbia and Saskatchewan, although lower than
in Ontario, and a similar comparison holds, on
average, for the whole period from 1981 to 2007
(Figure 2). Thus, there might be little room to
increase revenues from this source by enough to
reduce overall revenue volatility, particularly
without significantly increasing the level of 
tax-induced distortions.
Some of the smaller provincial tax bases are
quite stable. For example, gasoline taxes have a
coefficient of variation of only 3.2 over the period
from 1994 to 2007, while the coefficient of
variation for gambling revenues is 6.3. Payroll
taxes have been a stable source of revenues in
Ontario, with a coefficient of variation of only 2.1
over the period from 1992 to 2007,
14 and health
care premiums were a stable source of revenues for
Alberta. Nevertheless, greater use of these taxes to
reduce overall revenue volatility would have only a
minor impact; in some cases, greater use of these
taxes might even have undesirable consequences.
Alberta already exploits gambling revenues to a
greater extent than do the other provinces, so it is
unclear whether there is much opportunity for
further diversification into this tax base.
15 There
may also be little room for further expansion of
alcohol and tobacco taxes, while greater reliance
on property tax revenues could crowd out local
government tax revenues. The introduction of a
payroll tax (as used by Ontario) might raise the
cost of labour and, potentially, have a negative
impact on employment and other tax revenues.
Finally, given the large share of resource revenues
in total revenues and the magnitude of resource
revenue volatility, none of the prospective tax
bases is large enough or has enough room for
further expansion to have an appreciable effect 
on overall revenue volatility. 
In summary, tax base diversification likely
would have a relatively minor effect on Alberta’s
revenue volatility because its resource revenues are
large and volatile relative to the alternatives. Tax
base diversification could reduce revenue volatility
| 12 Commentary 313
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13 If, alternatively, we add British Columbia's sales tax revenues to Alberta's total own-source revenues less alcohol and tobacco taxes, leaving
resource and corporate tax revenues unchanged, the coefficient of variation falls to only 13.8, while the total own-source tax burden rises by
13 percent. A further alternative is to use a sales tax to replace the proportion of resource revenues that is, on average over the 1981-2007
period, of equal magnitude to the revenues from the sales tax. In this case, the coefficient of variation in Alberta falls to 9.4, a level that is
only about 40 percent greater than the average volatility in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario. The larger decline in own-source
revenue volatility in this case results because revenues from the most volatile revenue type – resource revenues – are cut almost in half. This
would represent a large fall in the size of the payment for the resource and, thus, a large transfer from the residents of Alberta to the owners
of resource firms. Further, to the extent that resource revenues arise from taxes on rents, the replacement of these revenues with revenues
from another tax might not be efficient.
14  Ontario collects approximately $300 per capita in payroll taxes, measured in constant 2002 dollars.
15  In 2007, measured in per capita 2002 dollars, Alberta collected $434 in gaming profits, while British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario
collected $223, $280, and $105, respectively.only if the revenues collected from the unstable
energy and corporate tax bases were significantly
reduced as a proportion of total revenues. This
would entail a significant increase in taxes from
other sources and, thus, in the overall tax burden,
or a significant decrease in the revenues collected
from resources and corporate taxes. 
Revenue Volatility and Stabilization 
from Exchange Rate Movements
Movements in the Canadian dollar tend to reduce
the volatility of movements in Alberta government
resource revenues. This occurs because there is a
generally positive relationship between the value
of the Canadian dollar and the US dollar prices of
oil and natural gas (Bayoumi and Mühleisen
2006).
16 For example, a rise in the US dollar price
of oil raises the US dollar value of oil revenues.
However, since the Canadian dollar appreciates
with the increase in the US-dollar-denominated
oil price, there is less of an increase in the
Canadian dollar value of resource revenues.
Similarly, a fall in the US dollar oil price leads to a
depreciation of the Canadian dollar, causing a
smaller decline in the Canadian dollar value of oil
revenues. In this way, the exchange rate acts as a
“natural hedge” that cushions oil price movements
(Frankel 2005).
Canada’s exchange rate policy is beyond the
control of the Alberta government. However, the
Bank of Canada’s policy of inflation targeting is
likely to increase the smoothing effect of exchange
rate movements on the Canadian dollar value of
energy revenues. Ragan (2005) argues that, to
reduce inflationary pressure following a
commodity price rise, the central bank tightens
monetary policy, which leads to an appreciation 
of the Canadian dollar. In this way, inflation
targeting tends to accentuate the positive oil price-
Canadian dollar correlation, thus increasing the
smoothing effect of exchange rate movements on
Canadian-dollar-denominated energy revenues.
The exchange rate moves for many reasons
other than changes in energy prices, so
movements in the exchange rate only partly offset
movements in US-dollar-denominated energy
prices. Thus, while exchange rate movements 
have reduced Canadian dollar oil and gas price
volatility, the volatility of both commodity prices
in Canadian dollars remains high. Measured over
the period from 1981 to 2007, the volatility of 
the real price of oil in Canadian dollars was 16
percent smaller than the volatility in US dollars,
while the volatility of natural gas was 9 percent
smaller, but the coefficients of variation of the
prices of both commodities in Canadian dollars
are still quite large, at 39.4 for oil and 42.0 for
natural gas (Table 2). 
Smoothing with Futures Options
Revenue volatility and uncertainty  can be reduced
with financial instruments specifically designed for
this purpose. For example, it is possible to pre-sell
commodities at a known price in futures markets
or to purchase “put options” – contracts that give
the purchaser the option, but not the obligation,




In Alberta, conventional crude oil royalties are
paid in-kind (Alberta 2008, 7). If these in-kind
royalties are sold in the spot market as they are
received, the revenue stream associated with the
royalties will depend on the uncertain and volatile
path of oil prices. An alternative to selling in-kind
royalties on the spot market is to pre-sell these
royalties, at some time prior to receipt, in the
futures market. This would eliminate uncertainty
with respect to the revenues received from the
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16  A similar positive co-variation between currencies and the price of export commodities is found for other countries, including Australia,
New Zealand, Chile, and South Africa (Chen and Rogoff 2003; Cashin, Céspedes, and Sahay 2004). This co-variation is consistent with a
rise in the world demand for a commodity that then causes a rise in demand for the currencies of the countries that export the commodity.
17  The use of such "hedging" strategies by Alberta is raised as a possibility in Tuer (2002, 66). See also Fildes, Koziol, and Riddell (1993); and
Hotz and Unterschultz (2009).| 14 Commentary 313
royalty payments since the price would be fixed by
the futures contract. Further, futures prices, at
least for contracts that are sold 12 months or more
in advance, have been found to be less volatile
than spot prices (Daniel 2001; Domanski and
Heath 2007), so pre-selling in futures markets 
also might reduce volatility.
While futures markets can reduce revenue
uncertainty and volatility, several potential
shortcomings are associated with their use. First,
the majority of transactions in futures markets
involve relatively short-term contracts (one or two
months), but to have a significant impact on
uncertainty and revenue volatility, the government
would need to enter into futures contracts that
cover at least the current budget year. As futures
markets are not generally very liquid at longer
maturities, the sale of the longer-term contracts
needed to reduce volatility is likely to be more
costly (see Larson, Varangis, and Yabuki 1998;
Domanski and Heath 2007; Borensztein, Jeanne,
and Sandri 2009). Second, futures contracts
cannot eliminate all revenue volatility since new
contracts will be sold through time and the price
locked in by these contracts will vary with changes
in the futures price. Third, while the direct
transaction costs of futures contracts are relatively
small, these contracts generally require the
commitment of significant assets to cover margin
payments, and the magnitude of these payments
can change by a large amount at short notice with
changes in the price of the underlying
commodity.
18 Finally, it is practical to use futures
contracts only to reduce the volatility of royalties
received in-kind,
19 but such royalties form a
relatively small part of total resource revenues –
conventional oil accounted for only 12.8 percent
of total non-renewable resource revenues during
the 2005-09 period, or about 4 percent of total
own-source revenues (Table 5).
20 
Options Market
The purchase of put options is an alternative
method of reducing revenue uncertainty and
volatility. Put option contracts provide insurance
against price declines by giving the purchaser of
the contract the option, but not the obligation, to
sell a commodity at a price fixed by the contract –
the “strike” price – if the market price falls below
this price. The purchase of options contracts has
two key advantages over futures contracts. First,
while a futures contract removes the downside risk
of a price decline by fixing the future price, it also
eliminates the potential benefit from a price rise.
The purchase of an options contract, on the other
hand, lets the purchaser benefit from price rises,
but protects against a price fall. Second, options
contracts, unlike futures contracts, do not restrict
hedging to in-kind royalty payments only. For
example, Alberta could insure itself against a
resource revenue decline by purchasing options;
then, if the market price of oil fell below the price
specified in the option, the government would
earn the difference between this price and the
market price. These profits would counterbalance
any fall in the value of royalties, both cash and in-
kind, associated with the fall in the market 
price of oil.
A number of oil-exporting jurisdictions –
Ecuador, Mexico, and Texas, for example – have
used option contracts to hedge against price
declines. Nevertheless, despite the potential
benefits of hedging with options contracts, it is
not common for energy-exporting countries to
hedge (see Blas 2009; Borensztein, Jeanne, and
Sandri 2009). Alaska, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
C.D. Howe Institute
18 Daniel (2001) suggests that margin payments can amount to 5 to 10 percent of the value of the contract.
19 While it is possible to hedge royalty payments other than those paid in-kind using futures contracts, this could expose the province to a
potentially large liability. For example, suppose Alberta were to sell a greater number of petroleum futures contracts than the quantity of its 
in-kind royalty payments and the price of petroleum rose relative to the price stipulated in the futures contracts. The province would then be
responsible for making up the difference between the spot price and the contracted futures price without necessarily having a counterbalancing
rise in its own revenues, since energy prices and royalty revenues, although highly correlated, do not necessarily move one for one.
20 Hotz and Unterschultz (2009) use simulations to assess the benefit of using futures markets to reduce budget forecast errors. Using data 
from the 1995-2004 period, they conclude that the benefits for Alberta are unlikely to outweigh the costs.Commentary 313 | 15
and Louisiana have all examined the costs and
benefits of options and decided not to proceed in
this direction.
One reason jurisdictions might have hesitated
to use options markets to reduce the volatility of
revenues is political (see Daniel 2001; Caballero
and Cowan 2007; Frankel 2010). If the market
price remains above the strike price for the
duration of the contract, the jurisdiction that
purchased the put option does not reap an explicit
benefit, but still bears the cost of purchasing the
option. While this is a characteristic of every
insurance contract, a government might find it
difficult to explain to the public why it committed
significant resources to the purchase of options
contracts that were worthless ex post (Caballero
and Cowan 2007). This type of outcome has been
used to accuse governments of using public
money to “speculate” in commodity markets –
in Ecuador, for example, it led to allegations 
of corruption (Daniel 2001). In contrast, if the
government does not hedge, it can blame any
budgetary problems on the vagaries of the
international oil market or speculators.
Another problem with the use of put options to
insure against a revenue fall is that these options
are generally expensive. Mexico’s 2010 hedge of
230 million barrels of oil cost US$1.2 billion, a
little over US$5 per barrel. Alaska (2002)
estimates that a three-year put option with a strike
price US$1 below the three-year futures price
would have cost US$3 per barrel, or 11 percent of
the spot price at the time (US$26). Simulations
for the case of Texas show that the ex post net
insurance premium  associated with the use of
options was equal, on average, to 2.6 percent of
oil revenues (Swidler, Buttimer, and Shaw 1999).
Thus, the cost of hedging can amount to a
significant proportion of total revenues.     
Several other potential shortcomings are
associated with the use of options as a method of
smoothing revenues, most of which are similar to
the shortcomings of futures contracts. First, put
options insure against a fall in prices only during
the length of the contract, but since contract
lengths are not indefinite, full insurance cannot be
obtained. Second, the purchase of longer-term
contracts is likely to be more expensive, as most of
the liquidity in the options market is at very short
horizons. Borensztein, Jeanne, and Sandri (2009)
note that most hedging through NYMEX is for
maturities of less than three months’ duration and
that the risk premium becomes very large for
longer maturities. It is possible to buy longer-term
options in the over-the-counter market, but these
contracts are illiquid and involve greater
counterparty risk than options traded on an
exchange. Third, a government that follows a
hedging program, particularly one using over-the-
counter instruments, must possess sufficient
expertise to run the program, understand the
risks, and monitor the activities of the hedging
unit in order to protect against trading losses.
21
Finally, while options can eliminate downside
price risk, options do not reduce revenue volatility
on the upside, and the reduction in downside risk
may even encourage excessive spending when
prices are high. 
Revenue Volatility with a Stabilization Fund 
The analysis above makes clear that revenue
volatility in Alberta is driven by resource revenue
volatility. On average, over the period from 1981
to 2007, the volatility of real per capita own-
source revenues excluding resource revenues has
been similar in Alberta, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia, and Ontario; accordingly, stabilization
of the revenue from resources is the key to
stabilizing Alberta government revenues. 
An effective method to achieve revenue
stabilization would be through the establishment
of a resource revenue stabilization fund. While
Alberta  has the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust
Fund (AHSTF),  the objective of this fund is not
the reduction of revenue volatility per se. In a
report commissioned by the Alberta Minister of
Finance, Tuer (2002) proposes that the AHSTF be
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21 As Larson and Varangis (1996, 28) note, the "cases of Codelco (a copper producer in Chile), MG Corp. (a unit of Germany's
Metallgesellschaft AG), Procter and Gamble Co., Orange County in California, Sumitomo, and Barings Bank have shown that the lack of
internal controls and systems to monitor the exposure from using derivative markets can result in very serious losses."| 16 Commentary 313
redesigned to stabilize the impact of volatile
resource revenues on the province’s budget, but
this has not been done. There is also the 
Alberta Sustainability Fund, created in 2003
and designed to stabilize revenues but it, 
along with the AHSTF, has been subject to
considerable discretion in terms of 
contributions and withdrawals (Busby 2008). 
Key Features of a Stabilization Fund
The two key design elements of the stabilization
fund we propose are the commitment of a fixed
percentage of volatile current resource revenues 
to the fund, and the withdrawal – the transfer to
current government revenues – of the long-term
real earnings of the fund and a fixed percentage 
of the total assets in the fund.
22 A fund with these
characteristics would reduce volatility in three
ways. First, a proportion of the most volatile
component of revenues, resource revenues, would
be deposited in the fund and, therefore, excluded
from current government revenues. This would
leave the more stable components of revenues,
plus withdrawals from the fund, available for
current spending. The ability of the fund to
reduce volatility would be greater the larger were
the share of resource revenues deposited in it.
23
Second, fund withdrawals would be based on a
long-term average real interest rate. An average
would reduce the volatility of this component of
transfers to government revenues, since returns
vary considerably from year to year. In general, the
longer the averaging period, the smaller would be
the volatility of real returns.
Third, withdrawals each year would be a
constant fraction of the fund’s stock of assets. 
This would reduce revenue volatility because 
the revenue paid out by the fund in a particular
year would be based on an unchanging fraction 
of contributions from all previous years.
24 A
withdrawal formula of this type also would
effectively eliminate the possibility of zero
transfers from the fund during a year – in contrast
to the experience of the AHSTF, where no
transfers to general revenues were made in fiscal
years 2002/03 and 2008/09, when the value of the
fund declined.
25
The stabilization fund we describe here would
not be a “rainy day” fund, as extra funds would
not be withdrawn when there was a negative
disturbance to revenues. Rather, the fund would
smooth revenues by weakening the link between
current resource revenues and current budgetary
revenues. Further, the proposed fund would not
require the government to identify the conditions
under which contributions and withdrawals
should be made. An added benefit of fixed
contribution and withdrawal rates is that they
likely would limit discretion, which can
contribute to revenue volatility. As well, this 




22 One way to make the fund even simpler and easier to understand, with little impact on the degree of stabilization, would be to dispense 
with the withdrawal of real earnings and raise the fixed percentage of total assets withdrawn each year.
23 Fixed savings-fund contribution rates are used by both Alaska (25 percent) and Norway (100 percent).
24  It is typical for stabilization funds to incorporate discretionary withdrawals (Davis et al. 2003, 282-3). Some funds rely on price forecasts or
moving averages of prices to determine contributions and withdrawals, but energy price forecasts are often inaccurate (Ossowski et al. 2008,
6) and, given the persistence of energy price movements, a moving average might give too much weight to recent prices. Even when
spending depends on a five-year moving average of resource revenues, a spike in resource prices can cause a large spike in expenditures
(Kneebone 2006b, 7).
25  With the current design of the AHSTF, revenue payouts into general revenues from the fund are equal to all current income of the fund, less
an amount required for inflation proofing (Alberta 2010a, 5).
26  Another budgeting method that has been used to reduce the risk of a revenue shortfall and the need to cut expenditures is to underestimate
revenues. Tying expenditures to a downward-biased revenue forecast would not change the degree of revenue volatility, but would provide a
buffer against an unexpected fall in revenue. This type of policy could also be used as a backdoor method of creating a “rainy day” fund, if
the “unexpected” surpluses were saved, but it likely would be difficult to create a sizeable fund in this way. A policy of this type also has two
other shortcomings. First, the ex post budget surpluses that result on average could be easily identified and might induce demands for
increased spending; for example, at the federal level, Robson (2006) argues that “padding” the bottom line in budget projections has led to
extra fiscal room and spending hikes. Second, this type of policy would quickly make budget forecasts non-credible and could lead to a
political backlash and calls for tax reductions, which would defeat the purpose of the buffer.Commentary 313 | 17
A related benefit of this type of stabilization
fund is that it would reduce revenue uncertainty,
as current and future revenues would depend on
past contributions and the long-term earnings of
the fund. As a result, the government would have
considerable information on the future path of
transfers from the fund and could use this
information to plan expenditures, which, in turn,
might encourage the province to take a longer
term view of budgeting. An added advantage is
that, since the fund would be backward-looking,
forecasts of future energy prices, which tend to 
be highly uncertain, would not be required. In
particular, the government need not estimate
whether a shock to energy prices was transitory 
or permanent. 
While such a stabilization fund is designed to
address revenue volatility, it would also create a
store of wealth for future generations, which
makes it similar to a savings fund. Proponents of
savings funds take the view that, since resource
revenues arise from the conversion of physical
assets into financial assets, governments should
treat resource revenues as wealth and, therefore,
should spend only the annuity value of this
wealth, leaving the balance in a savings fund to
support the provision of services to future
generations.
27 The fund we propose here would
differ, however, from a pure savings fund in terms
of the payout rule, which, in general, would be
greater than the real rate of interest. Nevertheless,
as the stabilization fund smooths revenues over
long periods, it likely would transfer resources
between generations.
28
An Example of Revenue 
Stabilization with a Fund 
Using data on actual revenues over the past 30
years, a simple example shows the extent to which
a stabilization fund could reduce revenue
volatility.
29 In this simulation, 75 percent of
Alberta’s resource revenues are committed to a
fund each year; if all non-renewable resource
revenues were added to the fund, as Tuer (2002,
51) recommends, there would be even greater
revenue stabilization.
30 Each year, the fund pays
out to general revenues the average real earnings of
the fund plus 5 percent of the total assets in the
fund. Since real interest rates vary considerably,
greater smoothing is achieved with the use of an
average return over a long period, so the
simulation employs the average medium term real
Government of Canada bond yield over the
previous 20 years. Five percent, or one-twentieth,
of total assets is withdrawn each year in order to
smooth earnings over many years.
31 A long time
frame assists in revenue smoothing since Alberta
revenue downturns and upturns tend to be long
lived, often lasting five to ten years, as we showed
in Figure 1.
32
Under this scheme, the volatility of own-source
revenues, net of contributions to and withdrawals
from the fund, falls from 15.4 to 5.9, a decline of
over 60 percent. This level of volatility is lower
than the revenue volatility of British Columbia,
Saskatchewan, and Ontario (Table 7). Figure 4
illustrates the simulated contributions to the fund
and withdrawals from the fund as well as the
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27  Studies that discuss savings funds and the related issues of intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability include Engel and Valdes (2000);
Barnett and Ossowski (2002); Davis et al. (2003); Kneebone, McKenzie, and Taylor (2004); and Mintz (2007).
28  In the extreme case in which payments into the stabilization fund ceased, payments out of the fund also would eventually end. For the
example presented below, however, if payments into the fund stopped completely, it would take approximately 14 years for the value of the
fund to fall by half.
29  This example is intended for the purposes of illustration and does not adjust for the actual savings of the Alberta government  during the
sample period, such as saving through the AHSTF and other provincial government funds.
30  When the AHSTF was established in 1976, it received only 30 percent of non-renewable resource revenues. The contribution rate was later
reduced to 15 percent and then in 1987 to zero. The government chose to deposit over $1 billion in the AHSTF from general revenues in
each of fiscal years 2005/06, 2006/07, and 2007/08, part of which was allocated for inflation-proofing (Alberta 2010b).
31  The average real return is 3.4 percent, so withdrawals from the fund average 8.4 percent per year.
32  Tuer (2002, 52) recommends that the amount withdrawn should be the lesser of the average of resource revenues for the previous three years,
or $3.5 billion (the 20-year average of resource revenues). Given the large and often long-lived swings in resource revenues, Tuer's proposed
rule, based as it is on revenues from just the previous three years, likely would lead to greater volatility than the 5 percent rule we propose.| 18 Commentary 313
actual and simulated levels of own-source
revenues. The smoothing effect of the fund is clear
from a comparison of the smooth path of
withdrawals with the volatile path of
contributions.
33
Implementation and Other Issues 
The experiences of Alberta and other jurisdictions
reveal that a fiscal rule alone, such as the creation
of a stabilization fund, cannot ensure compliance
(see O’Brien 2010; Ossowski et al. 2008). Key
characteristics of a stabilization fund that may
increase the probability of success are simplicity,
transparency, and a gradual transition to full
implementation. 
The establishment of a stabilization fund would
require a start-up period in which contributions to
the fund initially exceeded withdrawals. To avoid a
sharp rise in taxes or fall in current expenditures
during this period, the contribution rate could be
gradually increased to the target level. Since it
would lower the required maximum net savings
rate out of resource revenues, a contribution rate
transition period could increase the likelihood that
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Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada data; see the Data Appendix for more information.
Figure 4: Own-Source Revenue, Actual and Simulated with a Stabilization Fund, Alberta, 1981-2007
33  Average per capita own-source revenues available to the government, net of contributions to and withdrawals from the stabilization fund,
would have been only 4.5 percent lower than actual average real per capita own-source revenues for the period from 1981 to 2007. This
lower average level of revenues follows because, in the initial years, the government makes contributions to the fund, but the fund has few
assets to disburse. Real per capita own-source revenues, net of contributions to and withdrawals from the fund, would have still been 25
percent higher than the average for Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Ontario. In addition, the total assets in the fund would have been
close to $75 billion by 2007. Thus, this fund, in combination with the Alberta government's other funds, would have yielded a stock of
assets similar in size to the $100 billion savings fund proposed by Mintz (2007).Commentary 313 | 19
withdrawal rules.
34 Meeting targets would be
particularly important in the fund’s early years, as
this would generate credibility with the public.
35
Of course, the longer the transition period, the
longer it would take to attain the full volatility-
reducing benefit of the stabilization fund.
Mintz (2007, 26) states that Alberta saved 30
percent of resource revenues between 1993 and
2007, while Kneebone (2006a) provides evidence
that the province saved almost 50 percent of
resource revenues between 1995 and 2005.
Simulations, illustrated in Figure 5, indicate that
the creation of a stabilization fund with a gradual
transition to the maximum contribution rate
would require net savings rates that are generally
below these levels. These simulations assume a
fixed withdrawal rate of 10 percent, real earnings
on the assets in the fund of 2 percent, and, for
simplicity, a constant stream of resource revenues.
If the stabilization fund were established with a
transition period during which the contribution
rate was gradually increased to 75 percent in
annual increments of 15 percentage points, the
net savings rate would exceed 50 percent in only
one year (the fifth). Alternatively, if the
contribution rate were gradually increased in
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34 Norway eased the transition when establishing its savings fund by not commencing contributions to the fund until the government's 
budget was in surplus.
35 Kneebone (2006b) argues that the pre-announced and feasible deficit targets introduced by Alberta in the 1990s helped build credibility for
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Figure 5: Net Share of Resource Revenue Saved with Different Transition Rates, Years 1-40| 20 Commentary 313
increments of 5 percentage points to 75 percent,
the net savings rate out of resource revenues
would exceed 30 percent during four years,
although only by a small percentage.
36
While shocks to resource revenues could put
pressure on the budget and lead to calls for the
fixed deposit and withdrawal rates to be
abandoned, this would be largely a transition
issue. Once the stabilization fund was fully in
place, the budget would be insulated from
resource shocks as volatile revenues were deposited
in the fund and an average of all previous
contributions withdrawn. Even large movements
in non-renewable resource revenues would have a
relatively minor impact on revenues net of
contributions and withdrawals from the fund.
37
One drawback of such a fund is that, as the
fund grows in size, pressure might mount for taxes
to be cut or the proportion of assets withdrawn
from the fund to be increased, making it difficult
to maintain contributions to the fund and prevent
ad hoc withdrawals.  A purpose of simple,
transparent, and fixed contribution and
withdrawal rules would be to counter this
tendency by making changes to the operation of
the fund obvious and easily understood. Frankel
(2010, 30-1) stresses the importance of a rule that
dictates a cap on spending out of a fund “to insure
that politicians will not raid the fund when it is
flush.” However, even if the government
maintained fixed contribution and withdrawal
rates, it could circumvent the fund by financing
expenditures through debt accumulation.
Ossowski et al. (2008, 24) suggest that “greater
focus on the non-oil balance in budget
documents…may foster an informed debate of
fiscal policy choices.”
38 Thus, if budget papers
treated government revenues as net of
contributions to and withdrawals from the
stabilization fund, deficits would be transparent to
both the public and policymakers. 
Former deputy treasurer of Alberta Al O’Brien
(2010) notes that a key lesson from the “Klein
revolution” during the 1990s is that, to be
successful, a policy must enjoy the understanding
and support of the public and key stakeholders.
Further, he argues that the policy must be
characterized by simple and open communication,
as well as clear targets, accompanied by the
meaningful measurement of results. Unlike
savings funds, which are focused on the more
distant goals of intergenerational equity and fiscal
sustainability, a stabilization fund would have a
short-term goal: the stabilization of revenues to
support stable expenditures. 
As many Albertans have experienced the real
costs associated with boom-and-bust spending
paths, it might be easier to build public support
for a stabilization fund. In contrast to Alberta’s
Sustainability Fund, which has complex rules for
contributions and withdrawals that have been
changed frequently, the stabilization fund we
propose  would be simple, transparent, and
straightforward, which would make it easy to
understand, communicate, monitor, and evaluate.
Given Alberta’s fiscal history, these features likely
would be critical to the success of such a fund. 
Conclusion
Volatile revenues can lead to the inefficient
provision of government services, stop-go
procyclical fiscal policies, and, potentially, slower
growth. Alberta’s government revenues are volatile
relative to those of other provinces, a volatility
associated principally with that of energy sector
revenues. Indeed, Alberta’s own-source revenues
less resource revenues are no more volatile than
the corresponding revenues of other provinces. 
One problem with revenue volatility is that it
usually leads to volatile government expenditures.
Revenue volatility is likely to be less of a problem
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36 If the contribution rate out of resource revenues is set to 75 percent immediately upon establishment of the fund, net savings out of resource
revenues would be 67.5 percent in the first year, but the savings rate would fall below 50 percent by the fourth year and below 25 percent in
year ten.
37 Norway's contribution rate of 100 percent effectively insulates its budget from oil price shocks (Ossowski et al. 2008).
38 This is also consistent with the recommendations in Barnett and Ossowski (2002).Commentary 313 | 21
if governments maintain stable spending during
revenue booms and busts. However, it is difficult
to forecast the extent to which revenues are
permanent when they depend heavily on energy
price movements, and this makes it difficult to
choose the correct balanced path for expenditures.
History also shows that, across numerous
countries and time periods, it is politically
difficult to control spending during revenue
expansions, even if these are likely to be
temporary.
Given the large contribution of the volatile
resource component to total Alberta government
revenues, there are few practical methods available
to stabilize revenues. The hedging of resource
revenues using futures and options markets would
be costly, could not remove all volatility or
uncertainty, and, given the experience of other
jurisdictions, could entail significant political risk.
On average, although not in every sub-period,
movements in the exchange rate have tended to
reduce the volatility of own-source revenues.
While this smoothing effect likely has been
magnified by the Bank of Canada’s policy of
inflation targeting, exchange rate movements still
act as only a partial hedge against energy price
movements.
Tax base diversification – through the
introduction of a sales tax, for example – likely
would have only a minor effect on revenue
volatility. This follows because the revenues that
could be obtained from these tax bases would not
be large enough to have an appreciable effect on
overall revenue volatility given the large
magnitude and volatility of resource revenues.
Further, several of the more stable Alberta tax
bases have already been fully exploited. The only
way tax base diversification could have a large
impact on revenue volatility is if there was a
significant relative increase in taxes on non-
energy-related tax bases, but this would imply a
rise in the overall tax burden or a very large
decrease in the revenues collected from resource
revenues and corporate taxes.  
An effective approach to address revenue
volatility would be to create a resource revenue
stabilization fund into which a large percentage of
the most volatile component of revenues –
resource revenues – was deposited. If withdrawals
from the fund were a fixed proportion of the
fund’s total assets, there would be a considerable
reduction in the volatility of government
budgetary revenues (net of contributions to and
withdrawals from the fund). A fund of this type
would also provide long-term revenue
predictability. Finally, while the fund would be
designed to deal with revenue volatility, it would
also create a store of wealth that would support
spending for many years should resource revenues
decline.
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Data Appendix 
All government revenue data are from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database, tables 3840004, 3840007,
and 3840008, which are based on Provincial Economic Accounts.
a
Data have been converted to per capita terms using Statistics Canada’s population estimates for Alberta
(V469503), British Columbia (V469818), Saskatchewan (V469188), and Ontario (V468558).
Values have been converted to real terms using Statistics Canada’s price indices for net government current
expenditure on goods and services for Alberta (V3840832), British Columbia (V3840036), Saskatchewan
(V3840803), and Ontario (V3840745).
Tax base data for Alberta are in current dollars and are from the Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database, as
follows: wages and salaries and supplementary labour income (V687289), corporation profits before taxes
(V687290), interest and miscellaneous investment income (V687291), personal expenditures on consumer
goods (V687648), final domestic demand (V687680), and personal income (V691711).
Average annual exchange rate data (Canadian dollars per US dollar) are from the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF’s) International Financial Statistics database (identifier: 156..RF.ZF…).
The West Texas Intermediate petroleum price in US dollars is the period average from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics database (identifier: 11176AAZZFM17).
Alberta natural gas price data are from the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, available online
at www.capp.ca/LIBRARY/STATISTICS/Pages/default.aspx#4luXUn7UFh0k; accessed on February 10,
2010. These are annual averages in Canadian dollars.
Data on disaggregated natural resource revenues are from various issues of the Annual Report of the 
Alberta Department of Energy.
The medium-term real interest rate was calculated as the three-to-five-year Government of Canada 
bond rate minus the consumer price index inflation rate over the corresponding year. These data are from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
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a We chose to use Provincial Economic Accounts data, rather than Statistics Canada's Financial Management System (FMS) data, because the
Provincial Economic Accounts begin in 1981, rather than in 1988 as the FMS data do, and because they disaggregate royalty revenue from
interest and other investment income revenue.Commentary 313 | 23
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